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SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN ILLINOIS
J. SINCLAIR ARMSTRONG*
I
PROCEDURAL REFORM
T HROUGHOUT her vigorous youth Illinois' procedural
law slept dreamily on. England had an industrial revolu-
tion. Popular clamor swept clean the judicial house. The
"Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, ' ' 1 and Orders of
the Supreme Court rose on the graves of common-law forms
and Hilary Rules.
Over America sprang codes of civil procedure. New
York led the way and its history is typical. Meeting the de-
mand of the developing community, the New York Constitu-
tion of 1846 directed a written code of law and procedure for
the whole state.2 The Code of Procedure, or "Field Code,"
was adopted in 1848, and served as a model for other states'
reforms. The Code of Civil Procedure followed in 1877. This
in turn was replaced by the Civil Practice Act of 1920, which
restored to the courts some portion of their old rule making
power, taken away in 1848. This had produced, by 1940,
301 rules of court explaining, expanding and interpreting
the 1578 sections of the Act.
Yet the nation's third state trundled along with an eigh-
teenth century law of procedure. That she could do so with-
out an uprising of all who went to law to settle their disputes
is more a tribute to human patience and docility than to the
adaptability and flexibility of common-law procedure.
Nor were there lacking voices demanding reform. In 1909
Judge Gilbert called for a substantial renovation of the then
existing practice. Yet even the scheme he propounded fell
far short of the New York Commissioners' accomplishment
of sixty years before. He did not ask abolition of the forms
of action, he would but slightly have narrowed the general
issue's scope, left the equity bill in most of its glory and let
law and equity wend their separate ways as of old. Yet he
*Graduate Harvard Law School, 1941; Member Illinois State Bar.
1 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66.
2 N.Y. Const. of 1846, Art. 1, § 17.
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was looked upon as a reformer.' No wonder Professor
Whittier put so little hope in what Judge Gilbert then offered,
and cried for a full-fledged code. "In 1883," said Mr. Whit-
tier,
the Lord Chief Justice of England suggested the possible need of a
pleading park to display the various curiosities of common law pleading.
Illinois bids fair to become that park. Entirely surrounded by reformed
procedure, she still maintains that the tortuous foot-paths of the fathers
are sufficient for her, and that she will have none of the graded roads of
the codes, not to speak of the macadamized highway of modem English
pleading. In fact, the decisions of our Supreme Court have made more
tortuous the old paths and less intelligible the old guide posts. . . . Tak-
en altogether, Illinois pleading may be said to be at least slightly(!) [sic]
behind the position in which a reasonably prudent profession would place
it. We have not lived up to the legal standard of the ordinary prudent
man.
4
Then in the next year a modern Jeremy Bentham ut-
tered some principles of procedural reform which have stood
as a guide and beacon light to students of procedure to the
present day.' ". . . the controlling reason for a systematic
and scientific adjective law must be to insure precision, uni-
formity and certainty in the judicial application of substan-
tive law," said Professor Pound.8 So "rules of procedure"
should exist only to secure to all "parties fair opportunity to
meet the case against them and full opportunity to make
their own case." 7 And, "the office of pleadings should be to
give notice to the respective parties of the claims, defenses
and cross demands asserted by their adversaries; wherever
that office may be performed sufficiently without pleadings,
pleadings should be unnecessary, and where pleadings are
required, the pleader should not be held to state all the legal
elements of claim, defense, or cross demand, but merely to
apprise his adversary fairly of what such claim, defense or
cross demand is to be." 8
One may speculate as to why such voices cried so long
3 Clarke B. Whittier, "Judge Gilbert and Illinois Pleading Reform," 4 Ill. L.
Rev. 174, 179 (1909). 4 Id. at 174, 175.
5 Roscoe Pound, "Some Principles of Procedural Reform," 4 Ill. L. Rev. 388,
491 (1910).
6 Id. at 388. 7 Id. at 496.
8 Id. at 497, Principle V. Professor Whittier, too, yearned for a system of notice
pleading, characterizing "the chief object of pleading" as "to notify the parties
respectively of the claims or defenses which will be advanced by their oppon-
ents." 4 Ill. L. Rev. 174, 178.
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in Illinois in vain. An answer may be that the criticism of
learned men of law found no rallying among the people. In
the long run the plain people suffer from anachronistic civil
procedure. They cannot bring their troubles to court if de-
lay robs them of victory. Certain it is that the lay public forc-
ed the reform in England after the debacle of the Hilary
Rules.9 Perhaps if the lay public had given reformers some
encouragement, Illinois need not have waited until 1933 for
its first modern Civil Practice Act.
But it is hard for a public lacking in organization to make
felt a need, particularly a need that strikes most people only
spasmodically and many not at all. There was no public law
revision committee to keep before the legislators the job to
be done. There was no "ministry of justice" to gather to-
gether recommendations and report where change was need-
ed. 10 Still it is a wonder that in a long era of commerce and
trade, of interchange of ideas of men in all realms of learn-
ing the winds of progress blew no seeds of procedural re-
form from England and the many states across the borders
of Illinois.11
That there was no procedural reform throughout this era
of course does not mean that the legislature never tinkered
with procedural matters. From 1827 to 1933 came a number
9 Of course, there were Englishmen of bench and bar, like Baron Parke, who
considered the law as it stood as the perfection of human wisdom.
"The law is the true embodiment
Of everything that's excellent,
It has no kind of fault or flaw,
And I, M'Lords, embody the Law."
(W. S. Gilbert, "Iolanthe").
Also it is a matter of common knowledge that the codes got a very cold re-
ception from many judges, steeped in common law, who first construed them.
The axiom that acts in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed
was the familiar refuge. Yet Pound points out that generally the English bench
and bar welcomed the reformed procedure and showed a disposition to make it
work. See, for instance, his comment on Lord Campbell, 4 Ill. L. Rev. 394n.
10 Benjamin N. Cardozo, "A Ministry of Justice," 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 123
(1921).
11 The recent publication of the correspondence between Sir Frederick Pollock
and Mr. Justice Holmes highlights the fact that not just through reported cases
and publications were American and English lawyers trading views. American
and English lawyers and jurists have long maintained close and personal re-
lationships. We in Chicago, for instance, have recently been visited by the
Master of the Rolls. And on a casual call in 1936 on one of the justices of the
King's Bench Division the writer found him closeted in chambers with a Pennsyl-
vania judge.
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of practice acts. But all of these dealt principally with minor
and local matters, such as venue, service of process, dock-
ets, times for pleadings and motions, and improvements in
a small way. The Practice Act of 187212 abolished the dis-
tinction between "trespass" and "trespass on the case,''13
pet-mitted joinder in the same action of counts in trover and
replevin, 4 and even went to the length of letting the de-
fendant have an affirmative judgment against the plaintiff
in a case of set-off in a contract action. 15 This typifies the
kind of adjustment and advance which the Illinois legisla-
ture was willing to make, and these examples are selected
at random from a number of statutes.
The contrast to the experience of England and New
York is marked. For no matter what the vicissitudes of the
new practice at the hands of the New York judges, 8 school-
ed in the common law, each time the legislature moved it at
least tried to move forward. 17 And the English judges were
perforce in positive cooperation with the progressive move-
ment in procedure, for Parliament wisely left to them the
rule making power.'" The Illinois Acts-there was one in
1827,19 another in 1845,20 two in 1872 for chancery 2' and
courts of record,22 one for county courts in 1874,28 and one
12 Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 774. Act of Feb. 22, 1872, Laws, 1871-1872, p. 338.
1 §22. 14 § 23.
15 § 30.
16 "The original New York Code of Civil Procedure failed of effect in many
important particulars with respect to which its provisions were well calculated
to achieve the ends sought because so many of the judges who were first called
upon to administer it were determined to limit its operation and preserve the
principles and the dogmas of the old procedure wherever possible." Roscoe
Pound, "Some Principles of Procedural Reform," 4 Ill. L. Rev. 388, 390 (1910).
17 Whether the legislature experienced long run success may of course be
questioned. The very best that can be said of a Practice Act 1600 sections long
and amplified by 300 rules of court is that the whole is unwieldy. But the
Practice Act to the contrary, one still may hazard the guess that the litigant was
less mired in the slough of procedural technicalities than he would have been
by the common law vehicle. But see Edson R. Sunderland, "Observations on the
Illinois Civil Practice Act," 28 Ill. L. Rev. 861, 864 (1934).
18 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 74. There is
a striking similarity between this and the enabling act for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1938) in that any rule made by the judges had to be laid before
both Houses of Parliament before taking effect. Cf. Act of June 19, 1934, Ch. 651,
§§ 1, 2 (48 Stat. 1064), U.S.C., tit. 28, § 723b, 723c. It is not clear whether the
Supreme Court may make new rules without submitting them to the Congress.
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1833, p. 486. 20 IM. Rev. Stat. 1845, Ch. 83, p. 412.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, Ch. 22, p. 198.
22 Ibid., Ch. 110, p. 774. 23 Ibid., Ch. 37, p. 326.
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in 1907, 24-simply accepted what the common law had be-
queathed, patched it up here and there, and rode along as
before.
Against the background of the state's vigorous political
and economic history, the story of her civil procedure, and
its stubborn resistance to ideas from outside, is amazing.
And it is against this background that the summary judg-
ment in Illinois is to be viewed.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STATUTES AND RULES
There is small wonder that legislators worrying about
distinctions between trespass and case little comprehended
the need or desirability for a streamlined summary judg-
ment procedure. Yet from an early day there has been a
limited "affidavit of merits" procedure. First used in only
Cook County, it extended in 1872 to the whole state, and re-
mained, slightly modified but more or less unchanged, until
the new Civil Practice Act of 1933. And perhaps it was this
early "as by default" procedure that kept the framers of
the 1933 Act from looking abroad to the liberal English and
New York rules for models for their summary judgment sec-
tion and led them to adopt the narrow Section 57.
The summary judgment would perhaps never have been
necessary if common law pleading had not become formal-
ized after its origin during the feudal times. If one knew
nothing of the law of pleading it would be the simplest thing
to do without it.
Take an example: if a man owes another money for
goods sold and delivered, the other brings an action in gener-
al assumpsit on the common counts. The man pleads the
general issue. Under this he may put in any one of a dozen
odd defenses. The plaintiff does not know what to prepare
for, what unexpected excuse may be given, not to mention
what wile or chicane. But suppose before the quarrel the
buyer dies. Now the seller simply presents a claim to the
executor. He says "I sold and delivered to your testator on
June first, 1900, a hundred barrels of turpentine for which
24 Laws, 1907, p. 443.
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he promised to pay, and the reasonable value is $1,000."
The executor finds no protection behind the screen of gen-
eral issue. If he has a defense he states it. "You said it was
turpentine but it turned out to be water: there was a breach
of warranty," he may say. If the issue is real the probate
judge may call a jury to decide, or even send it over to a
law court of general jurisdiction. But if the executor has
no defense that ends the matter. The probate judge can
forthwith direct the executor to pay. Whether there is a dis-
pute or not there need be no bother about pleadings. 25
What the summary judgment procedure endeavors to
do is make the result as easy when the parties are still
alive, still engaging in normal commercial intercourse. The
plaintiff files his complaint as before. It says nothing.
For that whereas the defendant, on the [first] day of [June, 1900], was
indebted to the plaintiff in [$1,000], for the price and value of goods then
sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, at his request: . . .
And thereupon the defendant afterwards, to wit, on the day and year
aforesaid, in consideration of the premises, promised to pay him the said
sum of money on request: Yet the defendant hath disregarded his prom-
ise and hath not paid any of the said monies or any part thereof, to the
plaintiff's damage of [$1,000]; and thereupon he brings suit. . . 26
We don't even know that the plaintiff is suing over some
turpentine. To all of this the defendant replies, "And the
defendant, by (Adam Jones), his attorney, says that he did
not promise in manner and form as the plaintiff hath above
complained. And of this the defendant puts himself upon the
country. ' 27 Still we have not budged an inch.
But enter a summary judgment statute. Plaintiff or some
one else with knowledge 'deposes and states all the evidenti-
ary facts. The turpentine was delivered on defendant's or-
der to his paint shop, invoice attached, on June 1. Defendant
never said there was water in the barrels, but used up the
turpentine in the course of his business. Yet defendant, with-
out any valid defense or excuse, refuses to pay. Therefore,
25 Here is expanded an idea hinted at by Roscoe Pound, "Some Principles of
Procedural Reform," 4 III. L. Rev. 388, 496n (1910): "It is curious that in
jurisdictions in which one may litigate a claim against an estate involving
$37,000 (as in Thomson v. Black, [200 IlM. 465, 65 N.E. 1092] (1903)) on an in-
formal statement of claim, he cannot litigate an ordinary debt or claim for
labor of a hundredth part of that amount without formal and technical pleadings."
26 Form suggested by Stephen, Pleading (Williston ed., 1895), p. 43.
27 Ibid., 172.
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN ILLINOIS
plaintiff moves that unless he shows a valid defense judg-
ment be entered against him without more ado. The affi-
davit is filed with the motion.
The defendant must speak now or else forever after
hold his peace. If the turpentine was diluted with water he
so swears, and swears how and where and when he dis-
covered it, and complained about it, and offered to give it
back. If his affidavit raises a real defense and shows evi-
dential facts of sufficient strength to support him, motion
for summary judgment is denied. There is a triable issue
of fact, triable to a jury. But if the affidavit of merits raises
no real defense, plaintiff gets a judgment forthwith. Indeed
if he has no real defense defendant will probably quit at
once. Thus the summary judgment procedure gets rid in
one fell swoop of litigious hypocricies and shams. And for a
litigant having a genuine dispute it clarifies the issues on
which the case is to be tried and gives an idea in advance of
the evidence to be offered and to be met. Thus the summary
judgment procedure accomplishes what a flexible pleading
system might have been able to do.
England first felt the impact of the summary judgment
eighteen years before the Supreme Court of Judicature Act,
1873. In 1855 Parliament passed a bill whose title aptly states
the end and purpose of summary judgment procedure. "An
Act to facilitate the Remedies of Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes by the prevention of frivolous or fictitious
defenses to actions thereon ' 2 made recovery on negotiable
instruments a swift and easy affair. The plaintiff was to
indorse on his writ, by which the suit was commenced, a
notice that unless the defendant within twelve days got leave
of court to appear, plaintiff would sign final judgment
against him for the amount claimed on the bill or note.'
Leave to appear could be had by defendant only by showing
that he had a defense on the merits, or at least that he had
enough in his favor by way of defense that it was reason-
able to make plaintiff prove his case to a jury.
This was an absolute reversal of the common law theory that the de-
fendant had a right to set up and go to trial upon any issue he pleased,
and that the genuineness of his defense could not be questioned in ad-
28 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67 (1855). 29 Ibid.. 1. 1.
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vance of the trial itself. Under this statute the plaintiff was presumed to
have a valid claim when suing on a bill or note, and the defendant was
presumed to have no bona fide defense whatever. This presumption
against the defendant could be removed only by producing sufficient
evidence by way of affidavit to show the probable existence of a good
defense.3 0
Of course the plaintiff did not have to avail himself of the
statute. If he attached no notice to his writ, this "presump-
tion" did not operate in his favor.
But the procedure, now gathering popularity, especially
with the business community, was amplified with the Judi-
cature Act. The schedule of rules promulgated by Parlia-
ment with the Act allows it where the plaintiff seeks "mere-
ly" to recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on a
contract, express or implied, or on a bond or sealed instru-
ment a liquidated amount, or on a statute or guaranty where
the claim is liquidated, or on a trust.3 1 Here the emphasis
is on liquidated claims. Apparently the Parliament thought
that such cases were about all that the judges could handle
in this summary way. Perhaps, too, such demands were
the most usual in ordinary commercial dealings. But gradu-
ally the judges felt their way forward until today the rules
meet the needs of a wide variety of cases. In addition to
those retained from the original schedule, there are now
included cases where a landlord seeks to recover possession,
with or without a demand for rent, a plaintiff seeks recovery
of a specific chattel with or without a claim for hire or dam-
ages for its detention, or of any property forming security
for payment of money, and "all other actions in the King's
Bench Division" (except libel, slander, malicious prosecu-
tion, false imprisonment, seduction, breach of promise, and
cases in which plaintiff alleges fraud) .32 Thus tort cases,
and especially personal injury cases, which were long ex-
cluded, and cases involving title to land, about which Eng-
lish courts have always been peculiarly sensitive, 33 are now
subject to summary judgment procedure. It is only to be
30 Edson R. Sunderland, "The Provisions Relating to Trial Practice in The
New Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 188, 196 (1933).
31 Schedule, § 7.
32 Rules of the Supreme Court, 0. 3, r. 6. The Annual Practice (1940), p. 192.
33 L. Hand, J., in Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 83 F. (2d) 168
(1936).
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regretted that Chancery Division cases are not also includ-
ed.
In comparison with the English experience and against
the background of her thriving economic development the
Illinois statutes akin to summary judgment are woefully in-
adequate. Yet however much they have been criticized by
latter day writers and however poor they seem compared
with other jurisdictions, under them a practice grew up
which was at least akin to the summary judgment proced-
ure and which facilitated the course of litigation as much
as might be expected in a jurisdiction so demonstrably back-
ward in civil practice reform.
In 1853 the Illinois General Assembly passed "an act to
regulate the practice in the circuit court of Cook county and
the Cook county court of common pleas.34
Any party having commenced suit in either of said courts, shall be
entitled to a default at any vacation term, upon proof of due service of
process upon the defendant, and a copy of the declaration with a rule
to plead, at least ten days before such term, unless such defendant, or
the attorney of such defendant . . . shall, before the expiration of said
ten days, if the suit be founded on a contract, file a plea to said action,
and also an affidavit setting forth that he believes he has a good defense
to said suit upon the merits. . . .3
Thus came the affidavit of merits to litigants of Cook
County. Its deficiencies are at once apparent, most impor-
tant of which is the lack of disclosure by defendant of the
defense he intends to rely on. But it is worthy of notice that
it is not tied to liquidated demands, but applies to all con-
tract cases, and is in this respect far more courageous than
the nineteenth century English summary judgment rules.
The Practice Act of 1872 extended this to all courts of
record in the state.
If the plaintiff in any suit upon a contract, expressed or implied, for the
payment of money, shall file with his declaration an affidavit showing
the nature of his demand, and the amount due him from the defendant,
after allowing to the defendant all his just credits, deductions and set-
offs, if any, he shall be entitled to judgment as in case of default, unless
the defendant, or his agent or attorney, . . . shall file with his plea an
affidavit stating that he verily believes he has a good defense to said
suit, upon the merits to the whole or a portion of the plaintiff's demand,
84 Act of Feb. 12, 1853, Laws, 1853, p. 172.
35 Ibid., § 3, Laws, 1853, p. 173.
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and if a portion, specifying the amount (according to the best of his
judgment and belief) ... 36
Here we find a considerable improvement in drafting.
Contracts are to include "expressed or implied" contracts,
but must be for payment of money. The plaintiff must show
the nature of his demand, not just state that he has one.
The defendant is to be allowed set-off and credits. But by
a set-off or credit, or a partial defense, the defendant can-
not stop the plaintiff from getting judgment "as by default,"
for the plaintiff can win on a portion of his original claim,
if not on the whole of it.
A criticism is, of course, that the defendant is not re-
quired to say what the nature of his defense is to be. But
even so the defendant, and less so his attorney, is not likely
to play fast and loose with the court by swearing that he has
a defense and then turning up in court with not a word to
be said in his favor. This section had possibilities of great
usefulness within its narrow range. It was amended in 1877,
but only to make it inapplicable to suits against executors
or administrators of decedent estates.3 7
The next major improvement came in 1907 as a cor-
rection of the criticism just taken. In the Practice Act of
that year were added the very vital words with respect to
the defendant's affidavits of merits: "and specifying the na-
ture of such defense."3 Now the plaintiff and defendant are
on a parity. Plaintiff must in his affidavit "show" the na-
ture of his demand, the defendant must "specify" the na-
ture of his defense. Also there is added what is left to im-
plication in Section 36 of the 1872 Act.
If the affidavit of defense is to only a portion of the plaintiff's demand,
the plaintiff shall be entitled to a judgment for the balance of his de-
mand, and the suit shall thereafter proceed as to the portion of the plain-
tiff's demand in dispute as if the suit had been brought therefor ...
Section 36 was clear that the plaintiff could win the uncon-
tested portion of his claim, but was not specific that he could
also proceed to trial on the contested balance.
Such were the statutes that grew up through the years
36 An act in regard to Practice in Courts of Record, 1 36 (Approved Feb. 22,
1872).
37 Act of June 2, 1877, § 36, Laws, 1877, p. 148.
38 Act of June 3, 1907, § 55, Laws, 1907, p. 455.
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and to which the framers of the 1933 Act looked for guidance.
Though these framers were writing a momentous and long
overdue chapter in Illinois procedural history, one cannot
help feeling that as to summary judgments they let a grand
opportunity slip through their fingers. There is an almost
slavish adherence to the words of the prior enactments.
• . . if the plaintiff, in any action upon a contract, express or implied,
or upon a judgment . . . for the payment of money, . . . or in any
action to recover possession of specific chattels, shall file an affidavit
•.. on the affiant's personal knowledge, of the truth of the facts upon
which his complaint is based and the amount claimed (if any) over ...
all just deductions, credits, and set-offs (if any), the court shall, upon
plaintiff's motion, enter a judgment in his favor for the relief so de-
manded, unless the defendant shall, by affidavit of merits filed prior to
or at the time of the hearing on said motion, show that he has a suffi-
ciently good defense on the merits to all or some part of the plaintiff's
claim to entitle him to defend the action. If the defense is to a part only
of the plaintiff's demand a judgment may be entered . . . for the bal-
ance of the demand, and the case shall thereafter proceed as to the por-
tion of the plaintiff's demand in dispute as though the action had been
originally brought therefor. .... 39
In 1941 the legislature amended Section 57 to bring within
its compass suits in equity, as well as actions at law, and to
allow the defendant to have a summary judgment of dis-
missal in his favor 9 a The applicable suits are contracts, ac-
tions on money judgments, and suits for specific chattels. This
is surely very narrow territory. The English statute had long
been more liberal. New York was just in the process of ex-
panding its rule. And the legislators need only have looked
across to the neighboring state of Michigan 40 to find a thriving
new summary judgment procedure.
The advance in New York was joyfully hailed by Justice
(now Judge on the Court of Appeals) Finch, 41 who as pre-
siding Justice of the Appellate Division, Supreme Court,
First Department, was instrumental in promulgating the
amendments to Rule 113 in 1932 and 1933. Rule 113 as adopt-
ed in 1921 allowed summary judgment to recover liquidated
sums on contracts and judgments (the old "debt on a rec-
ord" action). The amendments extended it to unliquidated
39 Act of June 23, 1933, § 57, Laws, 1933, p. 800.
39a Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 181.
40 2 Comp. Laws (1929), § 14260.
41 Edward R. Finch, "Summary Judgment Procedure," 19 A.B.A.J. 504 (1933).
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contract demands (except breach of promise to marry), to
demands (except penalties) under statutes, to claims for
recovery of specific chattels with or without claims for hire
or damages, to foreclosures of liens or mortgages, to specific
performance of land contracts, and to accountings arising
on written contracts. If no dispute appears from the affi-
davits, except the amount of damages, an immediate hear-
ing on that is to be ordered, before a referee, judge, or judge
and jury. If the defendant's affidavit shows a conclusive de-
fense he can have an affirmative judgment of dismissal in
his favor. The defendant may put in counterclaims and have
summary judgment on them.42 Indeed, the statute carried
the procedure so far that the next year the Commission on
the Administration of Justice recommended that the reme-
dy be available "in any action.'"
In connection with the beneficial development of pro-
cedural devices to accelerate litigation the importance of
leaving with the judges of the courts the rule-making power
cannot be overestimated. If judges, sensing the need for pro-
cedural renovations, content themselves with half measures,
then judge-made rules may of course be abortive. Apparent-
ly that was the case in the Hilary Rules. But generally
speaking the judges are more apt to know how efficiently
to manage the business that comes before them day after
day than a legislature lacking continuity of membership and
wanting, in the hurly-burly of politics, sustained interest in
judicial administration. We have seen how the Judicature
Act of 1873 gave the judges rule-making power. 4 In 1848
it was taken from the courts in New York. Says Judge Finch,
Since 1848, court procedure in the State of New York, as indeed in many
if not most of the other states of the Union, has suffered by reason of the
legislative branch of the government taking over the regulation of court
procedure. Such action was highly anomalous. Looked at from the stand-
point of reason, it would have been much more logical for the courts
to have laid down a procedure assuring certain fundamental procedural
rights to the citizen before his liberty or property could be affected by
legislative enactments. What actually took place, however, was that the
judicial branch of the government, which had the power to pronounce
the decision and even hold an act of the Legislature void because in con-
42 Rule 113.
43 Report of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York
State (1934), p. 286. 44 § 74.
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flict with the provisions of the constitution, was rendered powerless to
regulate the details and in some cases even the minute details of its own
procedure. 45
Under the Civil Practice Act the power to make rules of
procedure is now held by a majority of the justices of the
Appellate Division, the rules to be promulgated by the joint
order of the Presiding Justices of the Four Departments. 6
The 1933 Illinois Act, it is true, returns some rule mak-
ing power to the justices of the Supreme Court, thus depart-
ing from "immemorial tradition. ' 47 Sunderland calls it "a
very extensive rule making power." However extensive it
may be generally, it is far from extensive as to summary
judgments. The types of cases in which the summary judg-
ment can be used are rigidly limited to the four that are
sanctioned by Section 57. These the judges cannot budge.
The court's rules have been confined to drawing the plans
for the affidavits to be used of claim and merits under the
section.4
The trouble with this division of authority in respect to
the regulation of procedural law is that the legislature re-
tains too much power and yet not enough to act intelligently
and wisely, while the judges are not given power broad
enough for effective action. The Judicature Act of 1873 con-
fined itself to matters of jurisdiction and judicial organiza-
tion, but the New York Civil Practice Act and now the Illi-
nois Act of 1933 deal with procedure with a fine toothed
comb.
• ..the major part of the field of procedure still remains under the con-
trol of the legislature. Every reform is a compromise. The tradition for
statutory regulation,49 which had continued unbroken during the entire
45 Edward R. Finch, "Summary Judgment Procedure," 19 A.B.A.J. 504, 505
(1933).
46 Judiciary Law, § 82, Thompson's Laws of New York, 1939, Part I, p. 1438.
47 Edson R. Sunderland, "The Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 188 (1933). The tradition has suffered invasion in recent times. The judges
of the important Municipal Court of Chicago had power to adopt rules of court
"in addition to or in lieu" of the provisions of the Municipal Court Act. Act of
May 18, 1905, § 20, Laws, 1905, p. 157, at 166.
48 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, §§ 259.15 and 259.16.
49 It may be that this tradition for statutory regulation which Professor Sun-
derland intimates was too firmly established even to "justify" an attempt to
supplant it can be classified under the head of "the influence of the frontier
spirit surviving the frontier." Cf. Roscoe Pound, "Some Principles of Pro-
cedural Reform," 4 Ill. L. Rev. 388, 397n. (1910). Frontier society feared that
the power of the judge might weight the scales of justice. Every effort was
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
history of the state, was probably too firmly established to justify any
attempt to entirely supplant it.50
Imagination and daring might have led the framers of the
Illinois Act into the path later taken by the proponents of
the Federal Rules. An Illinois enabling act might have grant-
ed the justices of the Supreme Court power to make rules
of procedure and to merge law and equity. A committee
under the Court's supervision might then have drafted the
rules, with ears open to the suggestions of the bar but with
eyes fixed on the goal of a flexible and modern procedure.51
And yet without giving to the judges a complete and
ample rule-making power the framers could still have made
better use than they did of the available experience of other
jurisdictions with summary adjustments. In 1931 summary
judgments were rendered in over 80 percent of the cases
proceeding to judgment in the King's Bench Division. 52
"This is the real explanation why less than twenty judges
can dispose of all the litigation in England brought in the
made to limit and frustrate the effectiveness of the charge to the jury, lest the
orations of eloquent advocates go for naught. "The circuit courts in charging
the jury, shall only instruct as to the law of the case." Act of Mar. 3, 1845, § 28,
Rev. Stat. of 1845, p. 417.
. . . No judge of the circuit court shall instruct the petit jury . . . unless
such instructions are reduced to writing.
"And when instructions are asked which the judge cannot give, he shall write,
on the margin thereof, the word 'Refused'; and such as he approves he shall
write . . . 'Given'; and he shall in no case, after instructions are given, orally
qualify, modify, or in manner explain the same to the jury." Act of Feb. 25,
1847, § 1, 2, Laws, 1847, p. 63. A people jealous lest a judge orally "explain"
the law of a case to the jury, and unwilling to let him comment at all on
the facts or the weight and credibility of the evidence, is far from a frame of
mind willing to grant to the courts a broad rule making power. Surely the
demands of modern economic society would "justify" supplanting this frontier
tradition with a new procedural technique, fashioned by the judges and sensitive
to the changing needs of the bar and of the litigants the bar represents.
50 Edson R. Sunderland, "The Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
188, 191 (1933).
51 Perhaps this speculation is too optimistic, for after the legislature abolished
the forms of action and the formal distinction between actions at law and suits
in equity, Civil Practice Act, § 31, the judges promulgated Rule 9 requiring
every complaint to be marked "at law" or "in chancery." The distinction is
entrenched and perpetuated by the 1941 amendment of § 57. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
Ch. 110, § 181.
52 The score for 1931 was: summary judgments, 5,434, judgments after trial,
1,240. Civil Judicial Statistics, England and Wales, 1931, Table IX, p. 16, Com-
mand Paper 4187. For 1937 the score was 3,758 to 1,470. Civil Judicial Statistics,
England and Wales, 1937, Table IX, p. 16, Command Paper 5859. For 1938, the
latest year available, the score was 4,067 to 1,462. Civil Judicial Statistics, Eng-
land and Wales, 1938, Table IX, p. 16, Command Paper 6135.
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higher courts of general jurisdiction. 03 In New York be-
tween June 1932 and June 1933 there were 1,569 applications,
of which 988 were granted. "Causes were thus disposed of
which, if tried in the ordinary way, would have taken the
time of several additional Supreme Court Judges for one full
court year.'"'" Detroit lawyers told Professor Sunderland
that summary judgment practice was "the only thing that
makes the life of a Detroit lawyer worth living."5 5 And yet
the framers apparently closed their eyes to the data from
other jurisdictions before them and looked only to the prior
Illinois statutes. Thus the affidavit of merits section of the
1907 Act5" turns up with a few minor changes as the sum-
mary judgments section57 of the new Civil Practice Act.
Dean (now Judge) Clark, in reviewing the Act for the Chi-
cago Law Review, called the section providing for sum-
mary judgments 8 "admirable." 59 He was apparently try-
ing to make the framers and supporters of the Act feel a
glow of accomplishment. Yet he could not resist a footnote.
The provisions for summary judgment, . . . good as far as they go, are
still over-restricted in the kinds of actions to which they apply, in the
lack of definite authority to the court to decide questions of law on the
summary proceedings, and in the lack of authority to grant such judg-
ments to defendants.60
And as to the Act in general he says,
Making all due allowances, however, for substantial gains, one cannot
avoid regret that an act in many ways so extensive in character and so
53 Edson R. Sunderland, "Observations on the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 28
Ill. L. Rev. 861, 871 (1934).
54 Edward R. Finch, "Summary Judgment Procedure," 19 A.B.A.J. 504, 506
(1933).
55 Edson R. Sunderland, "Observations on the Illinois Civil Practice Act,"
28 Ill. L. Rev. 861, 871 (1934).
56 § 55; Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1913, Ch. 110, § 55.
57 § 57; Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1913, Ch. 110, § 57.
58 Ibid.
59 Charles E. Clark, "The New Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 209, 211 (1933).
60 Id. at 211n. This lack of authority to the court to enter a summary judg-
ment of dismissal in defendant's favor where plaintiff by the affidavits is shown
to have no case was most unfortunate. One of the amendments to Rule 113 gave
the court such authority in New York. "I remember the ineffectual plea of a
defendant prior to the adoption of the amendment, that if he could not have
the advantage of summary judgment procedure, but instead had to proceed by
formal trial he would be required to go to the inconvenience and expense of
bringing witnesses from seventeen states. This amendment will lower the
nuisance value of unfounded claims and suits." Edward R. Finch, "Summary
Judgment Procedure," 19 A.B.A.J. 504, 508 (1933). The absurdity of not letting
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upsetting to the present settled habits of bench and bar did not go still
further to establish an outstanding system of practice. Members of the
profession will now find that they must adjust themselves to an essenti-
ally new procedure. There would have been no additional hardship in go-
ing the complete distance in the way of reform. 6
1
And go the complete distance Dean Clark did in fram-
ing the summary judgment rule for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. A party asserting, or against whom is as-
serted, any kind of claim may have a summary judgment. 2
This does not mean that the Advisory Committee were hasty
in their decision to go the whole way. At the outset alterna-
tive forms, either excluding certain torts, on the English
model, or all torts as in New York, or even all claims for
unliquidated demands,63 were mulled over. But these were
wisely put aside in favor of the complete rule. Then, too,
the procedure is not limited to cases where the parties em-
ploy affidavits. "The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, deposition, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that, except as
to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."64 The rule is broadly
enough stated to allow a summary judgment of dismissal
when defendant can by affidavit show that the court lacks
jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter, or that
the plaintiff lacks capacity to sue or is an infant, or that
another action is pending, or that res judicata, statute of
frauds, or statute of limitations, are applicable.
Finally, a pre-trial practice is sanctioned. If judgment
defendant have summary judgment of dismissal was accentuated by Illinois
Rule 16 (not in the original schedule) letting him have summary judgment on a
counterclaim. This is now corrected by the 1941 amendment of § 57. Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1941, C. 110, § 181.
61 Id. at 211.
62 Rule 56(a) and (b), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 723 (p. 704).
63 At first the Advisory Committee evidently thought that the Michigan and
Illinois Statutes applied only to liquidated claims. Tentative Draft, Part Two,
Oct. 16, 1935, (confidential-not published) Rule 70. In this they were wrong.
Michigan Comp. Laws (1929) § 14620; Illinois Rev. Stat. 1935, Ch. 110, § 185.
This they corrected, as to Illinois at Tentative Draft II, Jan. 13, 1936, (Confi-
dential-not published) Rule 41, p. 3, as to Michigan at Tentative Draft III,
Mar. 1936 (Confidential-not published) Rule 45, p. 3.
64 Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 723(c) (p. 704).
65 Such dismissal in favor of defendant is permissible under Ill. Civ. Prac. Act.
§ 48. So also New York Rules 107-110.
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is not rendered on motion the court may ascertain and specify
what facts exist and what are contested. It may then make
an order confining further proceedings to the controverted
issues, and on the trial the facts so specified are to be
taken as proved. 66 Taken in connection with Rule 16 on Pre-
Trial Procedure this provision is one of the most salutary
advances in procedural law since the advent of summary
judgments in England in 1853. And within past two years
pre-trial proceedings have found their way to Illinois, first
in connection with the use of summary judgments in the
Municipal Court of Chicago, 6 and more recently in the oth-
er courts of record pursuant to one of the 1941 amendments
of the Civil Practice Act. 67a So it is not at all fantastic to
urge that the framers of a complete new Civil Practice
Act, riding on the flood tide of procedural reform, let slip
a grand opportunity, when they drew Section 57 of the 1933
Act without opening to all cases the summary judgment pro-
cedure.
III
AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS PRACTICE UNDER THE 1872 ACT
Compared with her economic and political development
the story of Illinois' procedural law is a sombre chapter in
her history. She failed to live up to the standards set for her
both by the needs of her citizens and by the example of neigh-
boring jurisdictions in procedural reform. We have seen how
her "affidavit of merits" and summary judgment statutes
have lingered behind. And yet when we come to examine the
cases that arose under such statutes as Illinois had, it ap-
pears that a fairly successful practice grew up. To be sure
the statutes were narrow, applying only in contract cases.
66 § 56(d), 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 723(c) (p. 704).
67 This is one of the most important courts of the nation, having jurisdiction
in the city of Chicago over all actions on contracts, for recovery or conversion
of property, for injury to real estate and for recovery of possession of real estate.
Actions on "implied" contracts include those where though no contract relation
exists between the parties, the defendant has received money or property for
which, in equity and good conscience, he ought to pay. In such cases, the amount
involved is unlimited. The court also has jurisdiction in all other civil cases
where the amount claimed by the plaintiff does not exceed $1,000, exclusive of
costs. Municipal Court Act, § 2, Laws 1905, p. 158. There are thirty-seven judges
at respectable salaries provided for by the Act, § 8 (Laws 1929, p. 315, §§ 6
and 7). 67a Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 182a,
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And yet the bench welcomed them as they came along, and
interpreted them liberally with a view to accelerating the
speed of litigation. The bar, taking the cue, came to use them
in more and more cases as familiarity with the procedure
developed, until it appears that within its accepted limits
summary judgment procedure is a standard weapon of Illi-
nois litigants today. It may even be ventured that the broad
construction and forward looking attitude displayed by the
judges in the reported cases on the "affidavit of merits"
statutes contributed toward making a superannuated and
inadequate procedural vehicle last as long as it did.
An indication of how well the statutes worked may be
found in the types of cases in which the procedure was in-
voked. Of course no statistics are available, but the reported
cases show the trend. From comparatively few types of
cases arising under Section 36 of the 1872 Act, comparatively
many types of cases are reported under Section 55 of the
1907 Act and the bona fide summary judgments section of
the Act of 1933.
From the start the judges took the position, with but a
few aberrations, that the purpose of the affidavits was to
speed up justice. Technical objections and objections requir-
ing literal construction of the sections were brushed aside.
The salutary judicial doctrine established itself, not without
a struggle, that the affidavits limited the triable issues to
those set out therein, thus very much speeding the trial if
the case could not be settled by the affidavits themselves.
And frequently the court even refused to allow the defendant
to plead or file an affidavit if he had been guilty of dilatory
tactics.
Section 36 of the 1872 Act applied to contracts, expressed
or implied, for the payment of money. As might be expected
in the rising commercial community, suits on notes were
most frequent.68 Then there were suits on the common
68 Cavanaugh- v. Witte Gas & Gasoline Engine Co., 123 Ill. App. 571 (1905);
Gottfried v. German National Bank, 1 Ill. App. 224 (1878); Henry v. Meriam &
Morgan Paraffine Co., 83 Ill. 461 (1876); Mayberry v. Van Horn, 83 Ill. 289 (1876);
McCord v. Crooker, 83 Ill. 556 (1876); Rock Valley Paper Co. v. Nixon, 84 Ill.
11 (1876); Smith v. Bateman, 79 Ill. 531 (1875); Wells v. Mathews, 75 Ill. App.
395 (1897); Whiting v. Fuller, 22 Ill. 33 (1859), under the Cook County statute,
Act of 1853, § 3.
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counts on accounts stated,"9 suits on merchants' running ac-
counts, 70 and on "special contracts." ' 71 An appeal bond was
held a proper contract to pay money.72 But the most ingeni-
ous case brought within the statute was an action in which
the plaintiff filed a distress warrant for unpaid rent.73 At
common law distress is a remedy available to a landlord
without legal proceedings. The tenant's goods can be dis-
trained and sold, to satisfy the landlord's claim. But an Illi-
nois statute74 provided that "a proceeding by a distress war-
rant must be regarded as a suit for the collection of rent."7
Therefore the distress warrant was held by the Supreme
Court to be an action on the lease for the payment of the
rent according to the lease's terms, and so susceptible of
affidavits of merits procedure. From this case on it appeared
that the courts would make "contract for the payment of
money" stretch to the limit of statutory elasticity.
At an early date, the courts realized that the greatest
utility could be got from the affidavits if the parties were
compelled therein to show the nature of the claim or defense
intended to be advanced or relied on. In the 1872 Act it was
easier to make the plaintiff show his cards than the de-
fendant. Section 36 said that the plaintiff's affidavit must
show the nature of his claim, while the defendant need mere-
ly swear that he believed he had a good defense to the ac-
tion. This did not ask very much of the defendant. 76 Indeed
69 Haggard v. Smith, 71 IlM. 226 (1874); Chicago Stamping Co. v. Mechanical
Rubber Co., 83 Ill. App. 230 (1898).
70 Kassing v. Griffith, 86 Ill. 265 (1877); Kern v. Strasberger, 71 Ill. 303 (1874).
71 Allen v. Watt, 69 Ill. 655 (1873).
72 Coursen v. Browning, 86 Ill. 57 (1877); Mestling v. Hughes, 89 Ill. 389 (1878);
Myers v. Shoneman, 90 Ill. 80 (1878); Pinkel v. Domestic Sewing Machine Co.,
89 Ill. 277 (1878).
73 Bartlett v. Sullivan, 87 Ill. 219 (1877).
74 Rev. Stat. 1874, Ch. 80.
75 Bartlett v. Sullivan, 87 Ill. 219, 221 (1877).
76 Occasionally this was enough to trip up the defendant, however. In Henry
v. Meriam & Morgan Paraffine Co., 83 Ill. 461 (1876), plaintiff sued for $380 on a
note and $40 expenses of collection. Defendant pleaded the general issue and
nul tiel corporation, and filed an affidavit of merits to the $40 claim. Plaintiff's
motion for judgment for $380 "as by default" was granted. In affirming the
judgment the Supreme Court pointed out that if defendant's affidavit of merits
goes to only part of the claim, plaintiff can have judgment at once for the un-
contested balance. One's suspicion in reading the case is that defendant's coun-
sel did not realize exactly how the statute worked and did not realize that the
judges were going to take it seriously.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the Supreme Court said in 1875 that the only effect of the
statute was to require defendant to verify his pleadings.
Said Mr. Justice Walker:
We have never heard it questioned that the General Assembly has the
power to require any or all pleadings to be sworn to as a condition prec-
edent to their being filed in the case. And this is the effect of this statute,
and its only effect.
77
Fortunately the narrow notion expressed in this opinion
did not seem to prevail, and the court may have taken such
a limited view moved by innate judicial conservatism in de-
ciding constitutional questions. The constitutionality of Sec-
tion 36 had been attacked by defendant's counsel. Two years
previously the court had taken a much stronger position.
Referring to the affidavit of merits required by Section 36,
Mr. Justice Scholfield said:
We perceive no ambiguity in this language. It is reasonably plain and
concise, and it leaves no doubt upon our minds that it was intended by
the legislature that the affidavit filed with the plea should disclose, with
reasonable certainty, the entire ground of defense relied on, other than
such as is of a dilatory character .... 78
Just how much of the defense to be relied on had been shown
was a matter pretty much in the discretion of the trial
judges, for they were the ones to tell, as the grist of cases
ground through the mill, whether the defendants' affidavits
were sufficient.
But it can be demonstrated that the defendant's affida-
vit was not a mere verification of the pleadings. For in every
case where the affidavit of defense went only to part of
the claim the plaintiff could have a judgment at once for
the uncontested balance, notwithstanding the fact that the
pleadings did contest the whole declaration.79 "Having, in
the affidavit, alleged one defense, which has been confessed,
it is not competent to set up an additional defense not in-
cluded in the affidavit. The defendants having been allowed
all that they claimed, the judgment does them no injury."80
77 Honore v. Home National Bank, 80 Ill. 489, 492 (1875).
78 Allen v. Watt, 69 Ill. 655, 657 (1873). The holding was that after one affi-
davit had been knocked out, defendant could not set up another ground of de-
fense which had not been shown in the original affidavit. Defendant's affidavit
showed a defense to only a part of the plaintiff's claim, and the court granted
plaintiff's motion for judgment for the balance, denying defendant's motion for
continuance because another action for the same cause was pending.
79 Haggard v. Smith, 71 Ill. 226 (1874); Mayberry v. Van Horn, 83 III. 289 (1876).
80 Allen v. Watt, 69 Il. 655, 657 (1873).
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Further, the court frequently held that the affidavit of one
of two joint plaintiffs8 or defendants 2 was sufficient, and
also the affidavit of someone other than the plaintiff,8 3 such
as his attorney or agent. The court said succinctly in Brig-
ham v. Atha, "It can make no difference who makes the af-
fidavit of claiming, so it is the truth." 4 There is no case in
the reports letting the defendant's agent or attorney make
his affidavit of merits. Perhaps this would be too great a
stretch of the words requiring defendant to file with his plea
an affidavit stating that he verily believes he has a good de-
fense.85 But Snow v. Merriam86 set the seal on the doom of
the doctrine that all Section 36 requires the defendant to do
is verify his pleadings. Plaintiff declared on the common
counts, filing an affidavit of claim. Defendant pleaded, with-
out filing an affidavit of merits. Plaintiff moved for judg-
ment "as by default." Defendant then moved for leave to
file verified pleadings. The court gave judgment for plain-
tiff, denying defendant's motion. Thus not even veri-
fied pleadings, wanting a supporting affidavit of merits, could
have saved defendant from suffering judgment under Section
36. It seems clear, therefore, that the defendant is required
to do more by way of showing his hand than simply verifying
the pleadings, even under the 1872 Act.8T
Of course since the purpose of the statute is to provide
a speedy remedy for the plaintiff in cases where he does not
believe that defendant has any substantial answer to his
claim, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to state exactly what
his claim is and "the amount due him." Where in suing on a
note plaintiff asks for the principal amount "with interest"
he cannot have judgment on his affidavit of claim if he fails
to state the interest rate.8s But if the affidavit demands "in-
81 Haggard v. Smith, 71 Ill. 226 (1874).
82 Whiting v. Fuller, 22 M. 33 (1859), under Act of 1845; Smith v. Bateman, 79
Ill. 531 (1875).
83 Brigham v. Atha, 84 Ill. 43 (1876); Young v. Browning, 71 Ill. 44 (1873).
84 84 Ill. at p. 44.
85 IMI. Rev. Stat 1941, Ch. 110, § 160.
86 133 Ill. App. 641 (1907).
87 Willard v. Bristol, 251 Ill. App. 234 (1929) holds that verified pleadings, un-
supported by affidavit, do not meet the requirement of § 55 of the 1907 Act.
88 Gottfried v. German National Bank, 1 IMl. App. 224 (1878).
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terest according to the tenor of said notes," it is sufficiently
definite to satisfy the statute.,9
In determining the amount of recovery when the plaintiff
won "as by default" usually the court could give the plaintiff
just what he asked for. However, sometimes it was necessary
for plaintiff to produce evidence, on assessment of the dam-
ages. Section 37 of the Civil Practice Act of 1872 provided that
when any part of the demand was on an account, and de-
fendant suffered default, the affidavit of claim might be tak-
en as prima facie evidence of the amount due on the ac-
count, but the court might require further evidence.9" This
use of the affidavit could, therefore, only be made in actions
on accounts, and such use was discretionary with the court.9
Of course receiving the affidavit might not be reversible
error where other evidence sustained the assessment.92 But
the Supreme Court reversed a judgment "as by default" on
an appeal bond where the judge had used the affidavit of
claim as evidence of the amount due. "This action was
brought not upon an account," said Chief Justice Craig, "but
upon an instrument in writing under seal, and as the sta-
tute93 does not embrace a case of this character, of course
the affidavit could not be used as evidence."94 The bond
alone was not sufficient to sustain the judgment because it
only named a penal sum, while plaintiff's recovery was to
be the amount of the damages occasioned by breach of the
covenant.
In construing the statute as to the time when the affida-
vits must be filed and the time when the plaintiff may have
judgment "as by default," the courts show a vigorous de-
termination to hasten the plaintiff along. It might be thought
that affidavit procedure would be available only when plain-
tiff filed his affidavit of claim "with his declaration." 9 The
89 Gottfried v. German National Bank, 91 Ill. 75 (1878).
90 Haggard v. Smith, 71 Ill. 226 (1874) is a case where plaintiff's affidavit is so
used. 91 See Kern v. Strasberger, 71 Ill. 303 (1874).
92 In Rock Valley Paper Co. v. Nixon, 84 Ill. 11 (1876), plaintiff's affidavit was
received in assessing damages in an action on a note. Judgment for plaintiff
affirmed. There being no opposing evidence at all, production of the note war-
ranted the judgment. "The affidavit was unnecessary and without any impor-
tance as evidence."
93 Rev. Stat. 1874, Ch. 110, § 37.
94 Mestling v. Hughes, 89 Ill. 389, 391 (1878).
95 Rev. Stat. 1874, Ch. 110, § 36.
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN ILLINOIS
courts have allowed far wider latitude, and not required in
all cases that plaintiff file his declaration and affidavit of
claim simultaneously. Moreover, plaintiff might have an op-
portunity to amend his affidavit. 6 It may not even be nec-
essary for plaintiff to file his affidavit of claim until he learns
that defendant is going to plead to the merits.9" Nor, in get-
ting judgment, need plaintiff move to strike defendant's un-
supported plea from the files, as that would be but waste mo-
tion.98
The court may even be so ruthless as to give judgment
for plaintiff before defendant can plead at all. This would
seem impossible under the wording whereby plaintiff shall
be entitled to judgment as by default unless defendant "shall
file with his plea an affidavit" of merits. 99 One cannot tell
whether defendant is going to file an affidavit of merits with
his plea until he has filed his plea. But where defendant filed
a frivolous motion for a continuance, the court gave judg-
ment for plaintiff on the spot, without letting defendant plead
at all. 100 If the defendant demurs, the court may also not let
him plead after his demurrer is overruled.' This is strong
medicine, well calculated to prevent dilatory defensive tac-
tics. Further, the defendant cannot challenge the sufficiency
of the affidavit of claim on motion: he must plead and file an
affidavit of merits first. °2
A curious twist to the general rule that plaintiff cannot
96 Goldie v. McDonald, 78 Ill. 605 (1875). It is hard to decipher the exact facts
from the report. Apparently plaintiff filed his declaration while the court was on
vacation. Then he bethought himself of affidavit procedure, and more than ten
days before the opening of the new term he filed an affidavit of claim. This he
then amended. Plaintiff got judgment because defendant failed to file an affi-
davit of merits. On appeal defendant urged that plaintiff did not file his affi-
davit, a fortiori his amendment affidavit, with his declaration. The court
affirmed the judgment for plaintiff.
97 Wells v. Mathews, 75 Ill. App. 395 (1897). Plaintiff got a judgment by default
on a note, which defendant had reversed because a plea in bar was on file when
the judgment was rendered. Plaintiff then filed an affidavit of claim and got
judgment because defendant filed no affidavit of merits. The court in affirming
the judgment and dismissing defendant's objection that the affidavit of claim
had not been filed "with the declaration" said that under these circumstances
plaintiff had filed his affidavit in time because he filed it as soon as he knew
defendant was going to put in a plea.
98 Snow v. Merriam, 133 Ill. App. 641 (1907).
99 Rev. Stat. 1874, Ch. 110, § 36.
100 Chicago Stamping Co. v. Mechanical Rubber Co., 83 Ill. App. 230 (1898).
101 McCord v. Crooker, 83 Ill. 556 (1876).
102 Pinkel v. Domestic Sewing Machine Co., 89 Ill. 277 (1878).
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get judgment before defendant's plea is filed occurred in Ro-
bien v. Kooie. 1°0 Here plaintiff commenced suit before a jus-
tice of the peace, filing an affidavit of claim. Defendant filed
no affidavit of merits and plaintiff got judgment. Defendant
appealed. A trial de novo was awarded in the circuit courts
to appeals from the justices of the peace. Plaintiff then moved
for judgment under Section 36 and the circuit court granted
the motion before the case came on for trial. This the appel-
late court reversed, and rightly so. For pleadings in cases
appealed from justice courts are oral. Therefore though
defendant might have been in default for lack of a plea had
the action been started in the circuit court, he was not in
default here because an oral pleading could not in the nature
of things be due until the case came on for trial. The affidavit
procedure cannot hustle along the case of a plaintiff who
starts before a justice of the peace.
As to the affidavits themselves, finally, the courts took
a liberal attitude under the 1873 Act, not limiting them to
affidavits made in Illinois. An affidavit sworn to before an
Illinois commissioner residing in Ohio was held sufficient,
10
as was one sworn to before an official of another state auth-
orized to administer oaths. 1'0
IV
AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS PRACTICE UNDER THE 1907 ACT
In addition to the types of cases appearing under the
1872 Act the 1907 Act saw a broadening of the stream of liti-
gation by affidavit of merits procedure. The usual actions on
notes, 0 6 on the common counts, for goods sold and deliv-
ered,'1 7 and on bonds'01 appear in the reports. But other
new and variegated types appear. There are suits seeking
payment for personal services, 0 9 or for payment of special
103 107 Ill. App. 219 (1903). 104 Kassing v. Griffith, 86 Ill. 265 (1877).
105 The official was an alderman and ex officio justice of the peace of Pitts-
burg. Kern v. Strasberger, 71 Ill. 303 (1874).
106 Perry v. Krausz, 166 Ill. App. 1 (1911).
107 Bein v. Blazejczyk, 213 Il. App. 243 (1919); Colfax Grain Co. v. Bradford,
225 IM. App. 419 (1922).
108 Clark v. Selfridge, 195 IM. App. 357 (1915); Manufacturers State Bank of
East Moline v. American Surety Co., 230 Ill. App. 474 (1923).
109 Harrison v. Rosehill Cemetery Co., 291 Ill. 416. 126 N.E. 177 (1920), ac-
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contracts to supply goods, by manufacture or sale."' There
are suits on insurance policies, both for burglary"' and on
life." 2 There are suits for breach of special contracts to buy
commodities."' There is an action on a contract to convey
realty,"4 an action for damages for breach of an agreement
by a seller to repurchase a parcel of land,115 an action
against a guarantor of payment of rent by the plaintiff's
tenant,"6 and an action for damages for a tenant's holding
over after expiration of the lease."7 The affidavit prodecure
swept into the favor of litigants quarreling over transactions
involving realty to a far greater degree than before. An in-
teresting case"' involved an action for breach of warranty
of title where the grantor had covenanted to pay $10 liqui-
dated damages for each acre to which the grantee and his
successors should not retain quiet enjoyment. Finally, there
were suits on other miscellaneous contracts. 19
There are a number of cases illustrating smooth opera-
tion of the affidavit procedure and a commendable grasp by
the courts of how it ought to work in fairness to both parties.
Occasionally the courts made short shrift of a recalcitrant
defendant. In Cramer v. Illinois Commercial Men's Associ-
ation12 defendant pleaded elaborately but failed to file an
affidavit of merits. The court indignantly refused to set
countant's fees; Hunter v. Troup, 226 Ill. App. 343 (1922), attorney's fees; Mc-
Pherson v. Board of Education of Waukegan Township High School District, 235
Ill. App. 426 (1925), teacher's salary; Reddig v. Looney, 208 Ill. App. 413 (1917).
plumber's fees.
110 Goddard Tool Co. v. Crown Electrical Manufacturing Co., 219 Ill. App. 34
(1920); Stevens-Jarvis Lumber Co. v. Quixley Lumber Co., 229 Ill. App. 419 (1923).
M1 Cox v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 261 Ill. App. 394 (1930).
112 Cramer v. Illinois Commercial Men's Association, 260 Ill. 516, 103 N.E. 459
(1913); Dailey v. Grand Lodge, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 226 Ill. App.
164 (1922); Schoettker v. Grand Lodge, 214 Ill. App. 143 (1918).
113 Orsinger v. Consolidated Flour Mills Co.. 284 F. 224 (1922), cert. den. 260
U.S. 746, 43 S. Ct. 248, 67 L. Ed. 493 (1923); Teague v. John E. Burns Lumber
Co., 187 Ill. App. 225 (1914).
114 Technically this is an action on a bond for nonconveyance. McKey v
Provus, 181 Ill. App. 364 (1913).
115 Miller v. Thomas, 200 Ill. App. 125 (1916).
116 Cooper v. Anderson, 264 Ill. App. 1 (1927).
117 Kadison v. Fortune Bros. Brewing Co., 163 Ill. App. 276 (1911).
118 Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. of Cairo v. Townsend, 203 Ill. App, 457 (1916).
119 Watson v. Lee Loader & Body Co., 221 Ill. App. 57, 302 Ill. 276, 134 N.E.
719 (1922), contract to pay salesman's commissions; White v. Central Trust Co.,
259 Ill. App. 68 (1930), contract to sell trust property and pay cash proceeds to
plaintiff. 120 260 Ill. 516, 103 N.E. 459 (1913).
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aside a judgment for plaintiff when defendant's counsel en-
deavored to excuse himself by saying that plaintiffs in ac-
tions on insurance policies rarely filed affidavits of claim
and that therefore he had not bothered to see to it that de-
fendant file an affidavit of merits.
But the courts were also astute to protect the legitimate
rights of defendants. In Dailey v. Grand Lodge, Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen121 defendant filed an affidavit of mer-
its with his pleas. Plaintiff demurred to the pleas. The de-
murrer was overruled but the trial court granted plaintiff's
motion for judgment. This was error because defendant had
a valid plea supported by affidavit on the record and the
Appellate Court reversed. And in Harrison v. Rosehill Ceme-
tery Company,'22 the court reversed a judgment for plaintiff
where defendant's affidavit in fact disclosed a valid defense.
The 1907 Act adhered to the wording of the earlier statute
making affidavit of merits procedure in cases of contracts
"for the payment of money." The prediction implicit in
Bartlett v. Sullivan 2' that the court would stretch the statu-
tory words to the limit of elasticity was fulfilled in the cases
under the 1907 enactment. It is easy to see that a contract to
pay $10 an acre on a breach of warranty of title is a contract
for the payment of money. It is easy to see that a contract to
buy goods is a contract to pay money. It is even easy to see
that a contract to repurchase land is a contract to pay
money. Here the only thing defendant has failed to do is pay
according to his agreement. But it is a very different thing
to say that a contract to deliver lumber is a contract to pay
money. When the lumber mill fails to make good the buyer
sues in special assumpsit for damages for breach of a con-
tract to deliver, not for breach of a contract to pay money.
In Stevens-Jarvis Lumber Company v. Quixley Lumber
Company,124 the court held that a contract to deliver lum-
ber is an implied contract to pay money, within the meaning
of Section 55. Unless the idea is adopted that a contract is an
obligation to do one of two things in the alternative, either to
perform or to pay damages, this seems terribly strained.
121 226 Inl. App. 164 (1922), reversed on other grounds, 311 Ini. 184, 142 N.E. 478
(1924). 122 291 fll. 416, 126 N.E. 177 (1920).
123 87 IM. 219 (1877). 124 229 Inl. App. 419 (1923).
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The court, relying on a distinction made in Harty Bros. &
Harty Company v. Polakow12' between a contract implied
in law from the existence of a plain legal obligation existing
without regard to the intention of the parties and a contract
implied in fact from acts or circumstances indicating mu-
tual intention, considers an obligation to pay arising from
breach of a contract to deliver lumber to be an implied con-
tract to pay money. But the distinction seems to be wholly
insubstantial. A right of action in debt on a statutory pen-
alty is not on an implied contract to pay money. 2 6 An action
by a public official to collect taxes is not on an implied con-
tract by the taxpayer to pay. 127 An action on a judgment is
not on a contract by the judgment debtor to pay. 2 " To hold,
then, that there is a contract implied in law to pay money in
an express contract to deliver lumber is a remarkable vic-
tory of shadow over substance. And yet the result is wholly
desirable, as a matter of statutory construction, because it
opens to the beneficent influence of Section 55 all actions on
which the plaintiff may sue in special assumpsit, whether
his contract was to pay money, erect a building, or deliver
a carload of lumber.
We have seen how the 1907 Act required that the affida-
vit of merits specify the nature of the defense on which the
defendant intended to rely. No longer was it to be left to the
interpretation of hesitant judges that in the affidavit the de-
fendant was to show his cards. Under the new clause the
courts made good the rule that on trial of a cause in which
affidavits had been used, the issues be limited to those raised
therein. "Such affidavits," said Presiding Justice Dibell "are
pleadings in the sense that they limit the issues to be tried,"
and held them to be part of the record and examinable by
the appellate court without the aid of a bill of exceptions. 129
But although this doctrine is sustained by cases in all
four districts of the Appellate Court, a line of cases in the
second district seems irreconcilable with the accepted view.
125 237 Ill. 559, 86 N.E. 1085 (1909).
126 O'Shea v. Farrelly, 302 IM. 126, 134 N.E. 2 (1922).
127 People v. Dummer, 274 Ill. 637, 113 N.E. 934 (1916).
128 Rae v. Hulbert, 17 Ill. 572 (1856).
129 Beckers v. City of Kankakee, 213 i1. App. 538 (1919).
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In Reddig v. Looney 3 ' plaintiff sued for services as a plumb-
er, and the affidavit of merits did not deny that plaintiff had
furnished materials and labor. On the trial the court charged
that this must therefore be taken as admitted. The Appellate
Court, Second District, affirmed the judgment for the plain-
tiff. This was in 1917. Kadison v. Fortune Bros. Brewing
Company131 was a previous case to the same effect. The
first district held that when a landlord sued a tenant for hold-
ing over after expiration of a lease, an affidavit of merits
denying holding over did not put in issue execution and as-
signment of the lease, ownership of the property, or the right
of the owner to sue for liquidated damages for hold-over ac-
cording to the tenor of the lease. "All defenses the nature
of which are not set up in the affidavit, are considered
waived and are unavailable on the trial.1' 1 32 Then in God-
dard Tool Company v. Crown Electrical Manufacturing Com-
pany " Mr. Justice Heard for the Second District said:
We have set forth the affidavits of claim and of merits in so much de-
tail for the reason that by Section 55 . . . the respective parties are
limited in their evidence to the matters controverted by the affidavits.
After this the Second District went off on a frolic of its
own. Worse, the court was apparently unaware of what it
was up to. In Manufacturers State Bank of East Moline v.
American Surety Company3 1 plaintiff sued on a surety bond
on account of peculations of its president, alleging waiver by
defendant of a ninety days notice requirement in the instru-
ment. The affidavit of merits but in issue the president's
theft but did not deny waiver of the requirement that it be
notified within ninety days after the loss. The trial court ex-
cluded evidence controverting the alleged waiver, and judg-
ment was reversed. Yet despite this decision the court bland-
ly put down the following remarks, which seem entirely in-
consistent with the result:
Before the amendment [requiring the defendant to specify the nature
of his defense] was adopted the gates were wide open to the defendant
to offer any proper proof under any plea filed by him but since the adop-
tion of that amendment the gates are closed against him as to all
proofs not tending to support the specific defenses set up in the affidavit
of defense. We have held in Reddig v. Looney, supra, that matters of
130 208 IM. App. 413 (1917).
131 163 IlM. App. 276 (1911). 132 Id., 279.
133 219 IU. App. 34, 38 (1920). 134 230 IlM. App. 474 (1923).
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defense not set out in the affidavit of merits are waived and that a de-
fendant will not be permitted to give in evidence any matter of defense
not stated in his affidavit. 1
35
It is almost incredible that a court could hand down a deci-
sion so diametrically opposite to its written opinion in the
case.
McPherson v. Board of Education of Waukegan Town-
ship High School District136 followed in 1925, and at least
brought the court's opinion into consistency with its decision.
The trial court had refused to hear evidence in mitigation of
damages of what plaintiff, after dismissal in breach of his
teaching contract, could have earned in the employ of some-
one else. The affidavit of merits did not controvert the dam-
age of $411 alleged by plaintiff. The Second District reversed.
Mr. Justice Partlow said:
Under the general issue every material allegation of the declaration must
be proved as alleged, and if they are not proved the party bringing the
suit has not made out a cause of action. . . . This was the rule prior to
the passage of Section 55 . . . and it continued to be the rule after the
passage of that statute, except insofar as it was changed by the statute.
When appellee filed his declaration accompanied by an affidavit stating
the nature of his claim and the amount due, . . . if appellant had filed
no pleas and no affidavit of defense, appellee would have been entitled
to judgment against appellant, as in a case of default. But when appellant
filed the general issue and a special plea accompanied by an affidavit
stating the nature of his defense, a different rule was set in operation
so far as appellee was concerned. Appellee was no longer entitled to
judgment as in case of default, but it thereupon became his duty to prove
every material allegation of his declaration and, if he failed to do so, he
was not entitled to judgment. This court so held in the recent case of
Manufacturers State Bank of East Moline v. American Surety Company
of New York, 230 Ill. App. 474.137
This is a clear and complete statement of the heretical
doctrine, and the court adhered to it in a carefully consid-
ered opinion five years later. "According to the contention of
appellees," said Presiding Justice Jett, throwing up his
hands in horror in Cox v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Com-
pany,138 "a case would be tried in a cause in which an affi-
davit of claim had been filed by the plaintiff, and an affida-
vit of merits by the defendant, upon the issues made by the
affidavits instead of by the pleadings." Here defendant of-
135 230 IRI. App. at 481.
137 235 IU. App. at 429.
136 235 M. App. 426 (1925).
138 261 IMl. App. 394, 399 (1930).
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fered evidence that a condition of the policy that the home
office of the company be notified of loss had not been met,
though it had not raised the issue in its affidavit of merits.
For exclusion of this evidence the judgment was reversed.
And yet it seems that the result so scorned by the Sec-
ond District is preferable. The best opinion on the subject
was delivered by Presiding Justice Matchett for the First
District in Cooper v. Anderson.139 There a landlord sued his
tenant on the latter's guarantee of rent on assignment of the
lease to a third party, now in arrears. Defendant's affidavit
of merits showed that on assigning the lease he had been re-
leased of all further liability for rent. On the trial defendant
put in no evidence to support this, and plaintiff's evidence
showed a guaranty. But plaintiff offered no evidence to prove
execution of the lease, assignment, or amount of rent due,
and for this omission the trial court directed a verdict for
defendant. This the appellate court reversed. The court re-
lied on the decisions in Reddig v. Looney, Allen v. Watt,
Goddard Tool Company v. Crown Electrical Manufacturing
Company, and Kadison v. Fortune Brothers Brewing Com-
pany and specifically repudiated the Manufacturers State
Bank and McPherson cases.
The many decisions of the courts of this district to which we have re-
ferred preclude this court from accepting the interpretation of Section
55 as expressed in these last two cases. The statute in question is reme-
dial in its nature, not in derogation of the common law, and should, we
think, be liberally construed to the end that the injustice of delaying
litigants in the collection of their just claims may be obviated. It is true
that the affidavits do not take the place of pleadings, but the evidence
to be offered and the issues to be tried are limited to the issues as made
by the pleas as verified by the affidavits. When the plaintiff has filed an
affidavit with his declaration, pleas avail nothing unless they are also
verified, and only to the extent that the material facts alleged therein
are supported by the affidavit of defendant. It can hardly be supposed
that it was the intention of the legislature to require a plaintiff to offer
proof upon the trial of a cause which the defendant would be precluded
from denying. 140
Unfortunately no case in the Supreme Court resolved this
conflict but the latest case on the point favors the view just
set out.
1 41
139 246 Ill. App. 1 (1927).
140 Cooper v. Anderson, 246 Ill. App. 1, 11 (1927).
141 Frank v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 273 Ill. App. 445 (1934).
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Another improvement wrought by the 1907 Act was the
specific provision that where plaintiff was entitled to judg-
ment for the uncontested part of his claim, he might still pro-
ceed to trial as to the contested portion. McKey v. Provus14 2
nicely illustrates this. Plaintiff sued on a penal bond for
$3,000 for defendant's failure to convey a parcel of land. De-
fendant's affidavit admitted liability of $1,500. The court
gave judgment for that amount at once, without prejudice to
plaintiff's right to go to trial as to the rest. Plaintiff went to
trial, proved that the property was worth the full $3,000, and
got a judgment for that amount less a credit to defendant for
the $1,500 already paid. "Section 55 . . must be regarded
as a highly remedial statute intended to do away with the
technical rule of the common law which permitted only one
judgment to be entered in a suit. ,,
If there can be more than one judgment in an action
brought under Section 55, there would seem to be no analyti-
cal objection to plaintiff's taking a voluntary nonsuit on the
contested portion of his claim, and suing for it later. But
at this the court balked. In Bein v. Blazejczyk plaintiff
sued for goods worth $155. Defendant's affidavit conceded
liability for $80. Plaintiff took judgment for that and dis-
missed as to the rest of his claim. Then he brought another
action for $75. The court held that the judgment in the for-
mer case was a bar. The statute was not intended to do away
with the common law rule which forbids the splitting of a
cause of action, the court thought. "That rule of the common
law is based upon the fundamental principle that there must
be an end of litigation, and that a party should not twice be
vexed with the same cause of action."
It is true that a party should not be twice vexed, but
analytically Section 55 seems to allow him to be. If plaintiff
can go to trial for the contested portion of his claim, there is
no earthly reason why he has to go to trial in the very same
proceeding. Certainly the statute does not say so.115
Teague v. John E. Burns Lumber Company,'146 an
142 181 Ill. App. 364 (1913). 143 Id. at 367.
144 213 IM. App. 243 (1919).
145 Of course there would be further annoyance to the defendant, and increased
cost to the public in having two lawsuits where one would do.
146 187 Il1. App. 225 (1914).
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analogous case, correctly analyzes the effect of Section 55.
Plaintiff sent defendant a bill for $1,800 for lumber sold and
delivered. Defendant returned a check for $800 and a re-
ceipted bill for $1,000 for damages resulting from plaintiff's
delay, notifying plaintiff not to deposit the check unless he
accepted it in full payment. Under applicable law acceptance
would be an accord and satisfaction. Yet plaintiff banked
the check and sued for $1,000. The court held that because of
Section 55 he might recover. "If the debtor can be made to
pay promptly though unwillingly, by execution, the portion
of the indebtedness admitted, without prejudice to the right
of the creditor to the rest, why should he not be so made to
pay by the creditor by the use of a check for such admitted
portion, notwithstanding his desire to have it returned?"' 47
Here plaintiff has cashed the check. It is as if he had
got a partial judgment for the amount admitted to be due.
But here he can sue, take a nonsuit, sue again. So he should
be able to do the same where he has already got a partial
judgment. The only objection the court can trot out is the
lame talk about not splitting a cause of action. The cause
of action is the same in each case. In each it is in part ad-
mitted, in part contested. In each it is tried as to the balance.
If plaintiff can sue whenever he wants to in one, on analysis
there is no reason why he should not sue when he wants to
in the other.14
As to other points about the affidavit of merits practice,
the cases sailed along under the 1907 Act on a fairly even keel,
following the same course as under the 1872 Act. Section 55
made it clear that defendant in specifying the nature of his
defense had to disclose facts. For instance, it is not enough
for defendant in a suit on a note to swear that plaintiff is not
a holder in due course, he must show why. " 'Specifying'
the nature of the defense means the pointing out with par-
ticularity the facts which constitute such defense. To do
this evidently the affidavit must state in a direct and positive
manner facts sufficient to disclose the elements of a. substan-
tial defense. The affidavit should be as to existing facts, so
147 Id. at 227.
148 The reasoning in the somewhat similar case of Watson v. Lee Loader &
Body Co., 302 Ill. 276, 134 N.E. 719 (1922) supports this argument.
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that if false the party making it could be convicted of per-
jury."' 49 The affiant must swear that matters set forth are
true or believed true by him.15 Of course it is enough that
affiant swear. It is not necessary for the defendant to swear
to the truth of the matters stated in his affidavit of merits
when he is relying on the affidavit of another.' 5 ' The affida-
vit, to protect the defendant, must go to the whole or some
particular portion of plaintiff's claim, and the portion to which
it is a defense must be specified. In two cases the court struck
out affidavits of partial defense and gave plaintiff judgment
"as by default" where the affidavits did not make clear what
part of plaintiff's claim was contested.'52
As to the amount of damages that may be awarded under
Section 55 the courts seemed quite certain of their power to
settle the figure. Where neither party offers evidence, the
court may enter judgment for the amount claimed 5 ' or call
for additional evidence. In the Orsinger case the court found
the assessment easy without evidence submitted by plaintiff
because a commodity like flour has a market price of which
the court can take judicial cognizance.
As we have seen from the cases, a fairly successful prac-
tice grew up and flourished under the limited affidavit of
merits sections of the Practice Acts of 1872 and 1907. More
could have been desired certainly. But the bar seems to have
been aware of the opportunities and the bench of the respon-
sibilities of Section 36 and Section 55. In praise of the full-
fledged summary judgment section of the 1933 Act Mr. Sund-
erland is highly critical of the old affidavit procedure. The af-
fidavit of merits "is practically useless as a means for ascer-
taining whether or not the defendant has a bona fide
defense."' 154 ". . . the defendant was almost invariably able
149 Perry v. Krausz, 166 Ill. App. 1 (1911).
150 Hunter v. Troup, 226 Ill. App. 343 (1922).
151 White v. Central Trust Co., 259 Ill. App. 68 (1930). Under the 1907 Act it is
clear, therefore, that defendant need not file his own affidavit of merits. Cf. the
discussion under the 1872 Act. As to plaintiff's affidavit, Clark v. Selfridge, 195
Ill. App. 357 (1915) intimated that plaintiff might have to file his own, but this
was not true under the 1872 Act and Orsinger v. Consolidated Flour Mills Co.,
284 F. 224 (1922) held the affidavit of plaintiff's attorney sufficient.
152 Colfax Grain Co. v. Bradford, 225 Ill. App. 419 (1922); Rodgers v. Ridgley,
205 Ill. App. 22 (1917).
153 Orsinger v. Consolidated Flour Mills Co., 284 F. 224 (1922).
154 Edson R. Sunderland, "The Provisions Relating to Trial Practice in The
New Illinois Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 188, 197 (1933).
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to make a showing which would defeat him. To do so the de-
fendant was only required to file an affidavit of merits
in which he stated his belief that he had a good defense, and
indicated its nature. Such a device was practically use-
less."' 55 On the cases that arose under Section 36 and Sec-
tion 55 this seems to be an unjust damnation of affidavit of
merits procedure. Dean Clark is far nearer an accurate ap-
praisal of the working of the two sections when he says, "The
Illinois procedure, in its terms, is simple and, within its
limits (contract actions), has proved to be an efficaci-
ous remedy."" 6
V
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE UNDER THE 1933 ACT
Eight years of the summary judgment section of the
Civil Practice Act of 1933 have not brought so many cases
to the reporters as twenty five odd years of affidavit of
merits practice under the old Section 55, but the trend to a
broader use of the procedure is indicated by the cases that
have come already to the appellate courts. Plaintiffs are
seeking recovery on notes, 157 on bonds,'158 on guarantees of
the indebtedness of others, 15 and for personal services"
as before. Suits to enforce life insurance policies are brought
against regular companies rather than fraternal benefit so-
cieties.' 6 ' A receiver sues on a share subscription'62 and a
155 Edson R. Sunderland, "Observations on The Illinois Civil Practice Act,"
28 Ill. L. Rev. 861, 870 (1934).
156 Charles E. Clark and Charles U. Samenow, "The Summary Judgment," 38
Yale L. J. 423, 460 (1929). Though now antiquated by new statutes, especially the
1932 and 1933 amendments to New York Rule 113, this is still the best article in
the field.
157 National Builders Bank of Chicago v. Simons, 307 Ill. App. 562, 31 N.E.
(2d) 274 (1940).
158 People v. Marx, 370 Ill. 264, 18 N.E. (2d) 915 (1938).
159 Barrett v. Shanks, 300 Ill. App. 119, 20 N.E. (2d) 799 (1939), guaranty of
athletic club's indebtedness; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Cohen, 284 Ill. App.
181, 1 N.E. (2d) 717 (1936), guarantee of corporate bonds.
160 Fein v. Taylor Washing Machine Co., 306 Ill. App. 273, 28 N.E. (2d)
344 (1940); Ratner v. Bartholemee, 282 Ill. App. 298 (1935), attorneys' fees; People
ex rel. Barclay v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 308 Ill. App. 622, 32 N.E.
(2d) 323 (1941), salary; Shirley v. Ellis Drier Co., 310 Ill. App. 518, 34 N.E. (2d)
728 (1941), rev'd, 379 Ill. 105, 39 N.E. (2d) 329 (1942), commissions.
161 Guild v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 303 Ill. App. 509, 25 N.E. (2d) 558 (1940);
Kovae v. Modern Mutual Ins. Co., 307 Ill. App. 247, 30 N.E. (2d) 109 (1940).
162 Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen, 370 Ill. 523, 19 N.E. (2d) 363
(1939).
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shareholder sues to rescind a subscription and recover back
money paid." 3 There is a suit to enforce a shareholder's
double liability in a defunct bank."sa As on contracts
"implied in law" recovery is sought of interest accrued on a
judgment"4 and of arrears of alimony.'6 There is a suit to
recover a deposit in a savings and loan association. 65a
There is an action by a surety on a probate bond against an
administrator for the latter's defalcations which the surety
had to make good to the next of kin. 166 There is a suit to
recover part of a fund applied, contrary to the terms of a
contract, to the defense of a suit for an alleged patent in-
fringement. 167 Under the clause in Section 57 applicable to
actions to recover possession of land, an action under the
Forcible Entry and Detainer Act' 6 was settled by sum-
mary judgment. 169 A landlord recovered hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars of unpaid rent.1 9a And under the clause in
Section 57 applicable to judgments, a plaintiff got a sum-
mary judgment in an action on a foreign judgment. 170 Nar-
row as are the types of cases to which summary judgments
are limited, yet in its early youth Section 57 has displayed
considerable versatility.
In other states the most vital case arising under any new
summary judgment procedure is the case to test its consti-
tutionality against the claim that defendant is deprived of
his right to trial by jury. The short and complete answer to
this is that defendant is not deprived of a right to have the
issues tried by jury when there are no issues for a jury to try.
Perhaps the most formidable constitutional argument
was raised in New York, for Chief Justice Savage in a burst
of irritation had at an early day denied plaintiff's motion to
163 Mee v. Marks, 304 m. App. 370, 26 N.E. (2d) 516 (1940).
163a Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Haaker, 309 Ill. App. 406, 33 N.E. (2d) 154 (1941).
164 Graziani v. City of Chicago, 303 IlL App. 499, 25 N.E. (2d) 607 (1940).
165 Kellogg v. Kellogg, 302 Ill. App. 604, 24 N.E. (2d) 260 (1939).
165a Gliwa v. Washington Polish Loan and Building Asso., 310 Ill. App. 465. 34
N.E. (2d) 736 (1941).
166 People for the use of Dyer v. Sawyer, 284 Ill. App. 463, 2 N.E. (2d) 343
(1936).
167 Spry v. Chicago Railway Equipment Co. 298 Ill. App. 471, 19 N.E (2d), 122
(1939). 168 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, Ch. 57, § 11.
169 Wainscott v. Penikoff, 287 Ill. App. 78, 4 N.E. (2d) 511 (1936).
169a Crilly v. Board of Education, 312 Ill. App. 16, 37 N.E. (2d) 873 (1941).
170 Roberts v. Sauerman Bros., Inc., 300 Ill. App. 213, 20 N.E. (2d) 849 (1939).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
strike as sham a plea of general issue as "unheard of.' 7 1
The first case'72 under the Field Code adopted the more
liberal view, but this was overruled by Wayland v. Tysen 73
in 1871. Thereafter the court uniformly held that there exist-
ed "no power to strike out an answer consisting of a general
denial of the material allegations of the complaint, even
though the party verifying the answer was guilty of per-
jury. ''174 It is not unnatural that the courts derived consid-
erable satisfaction in overruling this line of cases and sus-
taining the summary judgment rule under the New York
Civil Practice Act. 7 5
Curiously enough no case has come up to test Section 57
of the Illinois Act. Instead, constitutional attack focussed on
one section of the summary judgment rule applicable, under
its own rules,'17  to the Municipal Court of Chicago. Rule
111 of the Municipal Court formerly provided for summary
judgment in cases of debts or liquidated demands, in the
usual manner, except that, after affidavits of claim and of
merits were in, the court might, on a further affidavit on
plaintiff's behalf, by an affiant having full knowledge of the
171 Wood v. Sutton, 12 Wend. 235 (N.Y., 1834). Mr. Justice Page, who was
chairman of the Cbmmittee promulgating the Rules under the Civil Practice Act
of 1920, cites a number of early English cases allowing the general issue
stricken as sham. See Dwan v. Massarene, 192 N.Y.S. 577 (1922).
172 People v. McCumber, 18 N.Y. 315 (1858).
173 45 N.Y. 281 (1871).
174 Edward R. Finch, "Summary Judgment Procedure," 19 A.B.A.J. 504 (1933).
175 Dwan v. Massarene, 192 N.Y.S. 577 (1922); General Investment Co. v. Inter-
borough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N.Y. 133, 139 N.E. 216 (1923).
176 Authorized by § 20 of the Municipal Court Act, Laws, 1905, pp. 225, 235,
the court under the energetic and scholarly guidance of the late Chief Justice
Sonsteby had adopted an elaborate set of rules. Some criticism was made on
the ground that they were too complicated and difficult for the lawyer, having
only occasional Municipal Court practice, to manipulate. See Schofield, "The
New Costs and the New Rules of the Municipal Court," 15 Chi. Bar Asso.
Record 85 (1934). It was recommended that these rules be abandoned in favor
of the applicable sections of the Civil Practice Act of 1933. Hershenson, "Report
of the Committee on the Municipal Courts," 16 Chi. Bar Asso. Record 281 (1935).
The Supreme Court's decision in Ptacek v. Coleman, 364 Ill. 618, 5 N.E. (2d) 467
(1936) was that the Civil Practice Act was not intended to apply to the Munici-
pal Court and could not constitutionally apply because it has not been sub-
mitted to the voters of the city by referendum as provided in Ill. Const., Art.
IV, § 34 (amendment adopted 1904). But this decision has been strongly criti-
cized. McKinley, "The Civil Practice Act and the Municipal Court of Chicago,"
19 Chi. Bar. Asso. Record 11 (1937). Be this as it may, the new Municipal Court
Rules have done away with Rule 111, supra, simply substituted verbatim C.P.A.
§ 57 and Rules 15 and 16, to constitute Rules 72, 73 and 74. The new Municipal
Court Rules became effective July 1, 1940.
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acts and stating that the defense was not in good faith and
the facts on which such belief was grounded, give summary
judgment for the plaintiff.177 In Diversey Liquidating Cor-
poration V. Neunkirchen78 plaintiff as receiver and liquida-
tor of an insolvent trust company sued to recover a share-
holder's subscription, and filed an affidavit of merits sworn
to by its secretary. Defendant denied the subscription and
by affidavit asserted that he had subscribed subject to the
proviso that his deposit in the trust company be accepted as
payment. Plaintiff then moved to dismiss, on an affidavit
that the defense was false and made in bad faith. This the
trial court granted. The Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment on the ground that Section 3 of Rule 111 deprived de-
fendant of his constitutional right of jury trial. 17-
This decision on analysis seems unsound. The purpose
of the affidavits, all agree, is to disclose whether there are
any triable issues of fact. This disclosure is to the court. The
trial judge must decide whether any issue should go to the
jury just as the trial judge must decide when to direct a ver-
dict, either when plaintiff has not sustained the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence, or has proved his case "up to
the hilt." Summary judgment procedure simply makes the
parties unfold their tales to the judge before the jury reaches
the scene. Whether plaintiff is allowed one or a dozen affida-
vits does not affect the quantum of evidence necessary to take
the case to the jury. If the defendant can force a jury trial
by putting in a sham affidavit in bad faith and for the sole
purpose of delay, we are back to Wood v. Sutton in one fell
swoop. 80 "If there are not issues of fact to be determined,
177 Rule 111, § 3. 178 370 Ill. 523, 19 N.E. (2d) 363 (1939).
179 The ruling that the summary judgment for plaintiff be reversed can be
supported on the ground that in this instance defendant's affidavit of merits did
make an issue for the jury. From the all too telegraphic statement of facts it
is not clear that plaintiff's affidavit gave details demonstrating the falsity of
defindant's story, and was unanswered. But because the trial judge may have
made an error is no ground for declaring a rule unconstitutional and void.
The argument in favor of the section's constitutionality is, of course, based
on the hypothesis that the plaintiff's counter affidavit demonstrated conclusively
the defendant's mendacity, bad faith and intent to delay.
180 The Municipal Court's note to Rule 111 says "it enables the court to ascer-
tain in advance of a trial in the usual manner, not only whether a defendant
has a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's action, but also whether the plain-
tiff's claim is meritorious. For this purpose the court may not only receive
affidavits but may hear witnesses in open court. By this means the court can put
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one is not entitled in a civil case to trial by jury .... The sum-
mary judgment law does not deprive defendant of a right to
trial by jury if the affidavits present no question of fact."'181
Another case that gives trouble under the Municipal
Court Act is Kellogg v. Kellogg.18 2 There plaintiff sued for
arrears of alimony due under a divorce decree of a District
of Columbia Court and moved for summary judgment. There
is no difficulty in getting this under Rule 111, which opens
summary judgments to debts or liquidated demands, but it
is not so easy to bring it within the jurisdiction of the court
at all. Section 2 of the Municipal Court Act opens the doors
to "all actions on contracts, express or implied, whether im-
plied in law or fact." The court construes an obligation to
pay alimony as a "contract implied in law." This is fan-
tastic. The accepted Illinois law for years has been that a
judgment creates no contractual duty."3 It is hard to see why
a decree should be different.
The courts under Section 57 apparently will follow in the
train of the earlier cases in holding that the purpose of the
a speedy end to the plaintiff's action on the defendant's defense or counterclaim
when the facts are so clear that, if the case were tried by jury, the court would
be bound to direct a verdict." Chicago Municipal Court, Revised Civil Practice
Rules (1935), p. 90. This argument is unanswerable. Chief Justice Sonsteby
states that for the most part the court's notes "represent the construction the
English courts have placed upon the rules." Preface, id., iii.
181 People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 250 Mich. 273, 230
N.W. 170, 173 (1930), in which the constitutionality of the Michigan summary
judgments provision is vigorously sustained. The opinion in Roberts v. Sauer-
man Bros., Inc., 300 Ill. App. 213, 20 N.E. (2d) 849 (1939) is in accord with the
argument advanced.
182 302 Ill. App. 604, 24 N.E. (2d) 260 (1939).
183 Rae v. Hulbert, 17 Ill. 572 (1856). Cf. the discussion under Stevens-Jarvis
Lumber Co. v. Quixley Lumber Co., 229 Ill. App. 419 (1923). Of course § 57 gave
the courts authority to give summary judgments in actions on judgments, and
this problem is peculiar to the Municipal Court.
It has been suggested that the early Illinois cases are wrong, as a matter of
orthodox common-law procedure, and that the common-law action on a foreign
judgment was in general assumpsit. The common law theory seems to have
been that debt lay on a domestic judgment of a court of record because it was
in essence "debt on a record," while assumpsit lay on a foreign judgment be-
cause a foreign court could not give a judgment "of record," in the home coun-
try. Nevertheless debt and assumpsit seem to have been used more or less inter-
changeably at common law. Chitty, Pleading (16th Am. Ed., 1876) 119, 121, 123;
Denison v. Williams, 4 Conn. 402 (1822); Scott & Simpson, Cases on Judicial
Remedies 239, 240 (1938).
In Illinois it was early settled that debt lay in an action on a domestic,
Greathouse v. Smith, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 541 (1842), or foreign (in the sense of sister
state), Rae v. Hulbert, supra, judgment. It does not affirmatively appear that
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affidavits is to determine whether there are any triable is-
sues of fact. The affidavits must state facts and the trial will
be limited to the issues stated therein."4 So far so good. But
the Appellate Court's decision in Chicago Title and Trust
Company v. Cohen s5 is big with unpleasant implications. In an
action on a guarantee of bonds, defendant pleaded the gen-
eral issue, but his affidavit alleged fraud in the inducement.
At common law fraud could be shown not under the general
issue, but only by affirmative defense. The court held that the
affidavit failed to deny defendant's signature on the bond,
that the issue of fraud could not be raised because it was not
pleaded, 86 and gave summary judgment for plaintiff. The
decision is unsatisfactory in that it does not appear whether
it was commenced before or after January 1, 1934, the ef-
fective date of the Civil Practice Act. The action is said to
be in assumpsit, and yet Mr. Justice Matchett goes out of his
way to state that Section 57, not the old Section 55, is appli-
cable. At any rate, the purpose of the Act is to introduce notice
pleading, and it would be folly not to let defendant prove what
he raised by affidavit of merits and to resurrect from their
well-merited graves the old rules about what can come in
under the general issue and what must be specially pleaded
under this or that common law form of action.
Under the new section it is accepted that anyone's affi-
assumpsit was improper. 5 Corpus Juris 1383 (1916) so asserts generally, but
authority does not seem to sustain it. Cf. Du Bois v. Seymour, 152 F. 600
(1907). But Illinois lawyers do not seem to have used assumpsit for this pur-
pose, for the cases say that debt is "the" proper remedy, while Puterbaugh's
Pleading and Practice (8th ed. 1904), in an extensive list of causes in which
assumpsit may be used does not include actions on judgments. Puterbaugh,
id. at 78, 445.
However, this is not really determinative of the point criticized in Kellogg
v. Kellogg. Whether or not assumpsit lies on a foreign judgment, it still can be
argued that the basis of an alimony decree is not contractual. It is far from
consensual. It may be an obligation imposed despite the most ardent 'wishes of
the divorced husband. It is arguable, therefore, that it was not within the con-
templation of the General Assembly that the Municipal Court would enforce such
an obligation under the words "implied contract" in the jurisdictional clause
(§ 2) of the Municipal Court Act.
184 Kovae v. Modern Mutual Ins. Co., 307 Ill. App. 247, 30 N.E. (2d) 109 (1940).
185 284 Ill. App. 181, 1 N.E. (2d) 717 (1936).
186 At common law in assumpsit fraud could be proved under the general
issue. The Hilary Rules changed this, requiring fraud to be specially pleaded.
Apparently Illinois did not follow the Hilary Rules, at least at first, for Strong
v. Linington, 8 Ill. App. 436 (1881), aff'd 111 Ill. 152 (1884), holds that fraud
may come in under the general issue. The rule in Chicago Title & Trust Co., v.
Cohen is therefore all the more unsatisfactory.
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davit will do, either for plaintiff18 7 or defendant.""' Of course
Rule 15 provides that facts must be stated on the personal
knowledge of affiant, and the court will make short shrift
of an affidavit on information and belief. 189
As to the time when one party or the other may get a
summary judgment under Section 57, a sensible practice
seems to be developing. Certainly when defendant pleads to
a complaint supported by affidavit without filing an affida-
vit in reply, plaintiff can get a summary judgment at once.'
If an affidavit of merits raises a real issue of facts, of course
the case must go to trial.'9 ' A proper way to fight an affi-
davit is by motion to strike. If defendant makes a motion to
strike without filing an affidavit of merits'92 it is like a de-
murrer, in effect admitting the facts in plaintiff's affidavit.
If the motion to strike is denied, plaintiff can have judgment
forthwith.193 If the motion is granted defendant may then
move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.1 4 This affords defend-
ant some measure of affirmative relief, though it is not as sure
as New York Rule 113's provision that defendant can have
summary judgment of dismissal. For the court may grant
a party leave to file another affidavit after one has been dis-
missed. However, the parties may not go on filing new affi-
davits forever. The court can call a halt where it will. 195
Furthermore, the benefits of the New York and Federal pro-
cedure, allowing the defendant an affirmative judgment of
dismissal, are now available in Illinois courts through the
1941 amendment of Section 57.195a
Dean Clark, in commenting on Section 57, regretted "the
lack of definite authority to the court to decide questions of
187 Barrett v. Shanks, 300 Ill. App. 119, 20 N.E. (2d) 799 (1939).
188 Fein v. Taylor Washing Machine Co., 306 Inl. App. 273, 28 N.E. (2d) 344
(1940). -
189 Roberts v. Sauerman Bros., Inc., 300 Ill. App. 213, 20 N.E. (2d) 849 (1939).
190 Guild v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 303 Ill. App. 509, 25 N.E. (2d) 558 (1940).
Either defendant knew it had no defense and pleaded only to stall for time, or
counsel was asleep to the effect of § 57 here.
191 Barrett v. Shanks, 300 Ill. App. 119, 20 N.E. (2d) 799 (1939).
192 He could not do this under § 55.
193 National Builders Bank of Chicago v. Simons, 307 Ill. App. 562, 31 N.E.
(2d) 274 (1940).
194 People for the use of Dyer v. Sawyer, 284 Iln. App. 463, 2 N.E. (2d) 343
(1936).
195 Fein v. Taylor Washing Machine Co., 306 Inl. App. 273, 28 N.E. (2d) 344
(1940). 195a Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 181.
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law on the summary proceedings.""'9 This fear is doomed
to prove groundless, it appears. For the courts have not un-
naturally held that plaintiff can have a judgment when the
affidavit of merits makes out no legal defense. 197 Such a de-
cision of course involves a determination by the judge of the
applicable law. And the courts have even specifically decided
that plaintiff can get a summary judgment when the only
question is one of law, even without explicit statutory auth-
ority. 19
VI
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
Before long summary judgments may be called on to
play an even more important role than ever they have in the
past under American statutes. The wave of procedural re-
form that gathered headway in the early thirties and rose
magnificently to give the Federal Rules has not spent its
force. Pre-trial procedure, left optional by Rule 16, has been
attempted by Federal courts in a number of districts. 9 '
Armed with opportunity for effective pre-trial discovery and
the taking of depositions on the one hand and with a right to
summary judgment on the other, a litigant can find power-
ful aid in pre-trial procedure. "No proposal for procedural
reform in American courts is more widely discussed today
than that of pre-trial hearings."2 0
The operation of pre-trial procedure is simple. A few
weeks before the case is ready for trial, the parties are called
before a pre-trial judge. Discovery and depositions have
made available to adversaries reasonably accurate knowl-
edge of the case they will have to meet. A competent pre-
196 Charles E. Clark, "The New Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 209, 211n (1933).
197 Mee v. Marks, 304 Ill. App. 370, 26 N.E. (2d) 516 (1940); People v. Marx, 370
Ill. 264, 18 N.E. (2d) 915 (1938); Gliwa v. Washington Polish Loan and Building
Asso., 310 Ill. App. 465, 34 N.E. (2d) 736 (1941).
198 Graziani v. City of Chicago, 303 Ill. App. 499, 25 N.E. (2d) 607 (1940); Spry
v. Chicago Railway Equipment Co., 298 Ill. App. 471, 19 N.E. (2d) 122 (1939).
199 District Courts in Massachuesetts, New Jersey, Oregon, and the District of
Columbia attempted it in the first year of the Rules. See Alexander Holtzoff,
"Twelve Months under the New Rules of Civil Procedure," 26 A.B.A.J. 45, 48
(1940).
200 Caplan "Pre-Trial System in the Municipal Court of Chicago," 22 Chi. Bar
Asso. Record 164 (1941).
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trial judge can then limit the issues to be tried, get stipula-
tions from counsel avoiding proof of formal matters, and
limiting the number of experts to be called, and often even
in many cases bring about a settlement. Add to the authority
of the judge the power to give summary judgment for either
party and the pre-trial procedure is a full-fledged agency
for rendering swift and summary justice.
With or without summary judgments, pre-trial proced-
ure in many states201 has overcome the initial resistance of
the bar"2 and assumed a vital role in the judicial machin-
ery. Calendars have been speeded up so that litigants need
not wait months and years before getting their day in
court. 3 The cost of litigation in terms of time wasted by
parties and counsel is cut down, the public cost of maintain-
ing courts and judges as a playground for litigation that is
procedurally outmoded and wasteful is reduced. The courts
can settle more controversies per judge-hour.
Illinois has not been deaf to the voices of pre-trial par-
tisans, and the Circuit Court for Cook County has had a modi-
fied form of procedure since 1935. But under its "assignment
procedure" the only function of the "assignment judge" is
to assign the cases to the proper calendar and to encourage
conciliation and settlement if possible. He has no power to
determine what the issues in the case, or, indeed, whether
there are any such issues. The full and ample provisions for
depositions and discovery provided by the Civil Practice Act
of 1933204 cannot be availed of on the assignment procedure,
nor can the summary judgment section of the Act.2 "5 The
power of the judge is "moral" rather than legal, persuasive
rather than compelling. And yet by the assignment proced-
ure the Cook County Circuit Court has had extraordinary suc-
2olMassachusetts, Michigan, Wisconsin, Texas. The list is not exhaustive.
202 How the bar saved pre-trial procedure from impending doom on election
day in Detroit is dramatically told in "Pre-Trial Hearings and the Assignment
of Cases," 33 Ill. L. Rev. 699, 704 (1939).
203 In three years of operation, pre-trial procedure brought the Superior Court
for Suffolk County (Boston), from four years behind to two years ten months.
The Detroit court went from forty to ten months in arrears during seven years of
operation. See "Pre-Trial Hearings and the Assignment of Cases," id. at 703.
204 §§ 58, 60, Rules 17, 18, 19. The best general discussion of depositions and
discovery under the new act is George Ragland, Jr., "Discovery before Trial
under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 28 II. L. Rev. 875 (1934).
205 § 57, Rules 15, 16.
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cess in speeding up the trial of cases on its docket. '6 It was
often recommended as perfectly "feasible to extend the pres-
ent assignment system into a regular pre-trial hearing.
20 7
The Chicago Municipal Court was the first to do just this.
The record of cases handled over the first four months of its
pre-trial practice is remarkable: of 5,200 odd cases on call
in September, 1940, 1,300 had been actually settled by the
pre-trial conference and a total of 27,000 disposed of by settle
ment, pre-trial conference, or dismissal, as against just un-
der 500 disposed of by trial before jury or judge. And for
the future the court has been able to promise that "a cause
of action filed for jury trial will automatically be called for
for pre-trial within sixty days after filing, and it will be set
for trial within thirty days.''2°s
It may have seemed too "forward-looking" for mem-
bers of our bar to urge even before summary judgment pro-
cedure has been enlarged to cover all types of litigation,
as in Federal Rule 56, that it should be thrown to the job of
implementing pre-trial hearings in the Illinois courts. But
there is no need for Illinois procedural law to linger behind
the caravan as it has in the last century. Today, as never
before, a premium is put upon efficiency. It may be that the
very future prosperity and safety of the American Common-
wealth will depend on the efficiency of its organized society
in meeting the needs of people. For years the need of efficient
administration of justice has not been satisfied. Therefore
the development of the past year is gratifying.
The first of this year 1942 saw a new pre-trial procedure
section, added as Section 58 to the Civil Practice Act by the
1941 amendments, take effect. 2 9 This amendment author-
izes pre-trial procedure pursuant to rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has adopted a new
rule, Rule 23 A, requiring all trial courts to provide a pre-
206 "The lapse of time before trial in jury cases was reduced from a year and
a half to about eight months." "In nonjury cases the lapse of time before trial
has been reduced from sixteen months to thirty days." "Pre-Trial Hearings and
the Assignment of Cases," 33 Ill. L. Rev. 699, 708 (1939).
207 Id. at 709.
208 Caplan, "'Pre-Trial System in the Municipal Court of Chicago," 22 Chi.
Bar. Asso. Record 164 (1941).
209 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 182.
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trial conference calendar.21 ° Furthermore, even if no pre-
trial conference is required by statute or rule it is open to
counsel for either party to move for such a conference.
The Circuit Court of Cook County has implemented Sec-
tion 5812 and Rule 23 A by the adoption of its new Circuit
Court Rule 25 .211 This provides a permanent pre-trial cal-
endar for law cases and requires the attendance of counsel
at pre-trial conferences just as the attendance of counsel
is required at the trial itself. These improvements have been
with us for so short a time that an accurate estimate of their
success cannot yet be made. But on the basis of the expe-
rience of the Federal courts, of the courts of other states,
and of the Chicago Municipal Court, it is safe to predict that
our experience with pre-trial procedure will be most salu-
tary.
"Judicial systems seldom respond to exhortations of re-
formers that they become practical and efficient. They con-
stantly show a resistance to the demands of everyday needs.
When considerations of efficiency are forced upon them, le-
gal scholars usually rush to the defense to show that in the
long run an inefficient method of doing things is more effi-
cient than an efficient one would be. ' 212 But to advocate
adoption of a procedural system sound in theory and success-
ful in practice in other jurisdictions should not put one in
the class of evangelist or reformer. The tangible advantages
have been realized before our eyes.
"The only touchstone of worth of a procedural device or
system is its practical operation. ' 213 The practical opera-
tion of pre-trial procedure, implemented on the one hand by
depositions and discovery and on the other by summary
judgments, can contribute substantially to the wise and ef-
fective administration of civil justice. It is in this that in
the future summary judgments may find a proud role.
210 For an excellent sketch of all the 1941 amendments of the Civil Practice
Act, see Albert E. Jenner, Jr., "Recent Legislation and Changes in Court Rules
Affecting Illinois Practice and Procedure," 23 Chi. Bar. Asso. Record 167, 237
(1942). With reference to new Supreme Court Rule 23A, see id. at 208.
211 Id. at 209.
212 Thurman W. Arnold, "Trial by Combat and the New Deal," 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 913, 945 (1934).
213 Sidney Post Simpson, "A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem," 53
Harv. L. Rev. 169, 206 (1939).
